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SOME RECENT AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE PROTECTION OF KNOW-HOW*
WILLIAM

D.

HAWKLAND**

ECENT American developments in the protection of knowhow reveal paradoxical shifts of policy that both encourage
and discourage the owners of valuable information and prove
afresh the validity of Chief Justice Hughes' dictum that the law
of this area essentially consists of "unruly concepts." 1 Some of
this unruliness, however, may be more apparent than real and
may stem from the fact that many courts, lawyers and scholars
fail to draw sharp distinctions between situations in which knowhow is misappropriated and those in which its owner, far from
.being the victim of rascality, becomes a rascal himself by overreaching efforts to exploit his own valuable information. This
paper is organized on the basis of this distinction and accepts the
burden of showing that American law is developing along lines
that are giving increasingly more protection to the owner of knowhow with regard to misappropriation while limiting his rights of
exploitation.
Some of the difficulties in resolving questions involving the
protection of know-how are due to the fact that this term, though
becoming increasingly popular in American legal circles, is seldom defined precisely. There is undoubtedly a tendency, however, to treat know-how as a trade secret and to define it as the
Restatement of Torts defines "trade secrets." 2 In this paper,
therefore, the terms "know-how" and "trade secret" will be used
interchangeably.
The Restatement of Torts provides that:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or

compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which
This paper was presented to the Eighth International Congress of Comparative
Law in Pescara, Italy, on September 4, 1970.
0* Provost and Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. B.S.,
University of Minnesota, 1942, J.D., 1947; LL.M., Columbia University, 1949.
1. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 532 (1935). See also
Schnatzel, Trade Secret Dilemma-Employers Beware: Are You Hiring an Employee or
an Employee and a Law Suit?, 38 U. CoLo. L. Rav. 311, 314 (1966): "The cases follow
no set pattern, even though there are a few basic principles. No single decision or group
of decisions can be construed as providing a conclusive answer to any particular fact
situation."
2. See, e.g., Ladas, Legal Protection of Know-How, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 160, 161
(1964).
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gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials,
a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers. It
differs from other secret information in a business (sec. 759) in that
it is not simply information as to single or ephemeral events in the
conduct of the business, as, for example, the amount or other terms
of a secret bid for a contract or the salary of certain employees, or the
security investments made or contemplated, or the date fixed for the
announcement of a new policy or for bringing out a new model or
the like. A trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in the
operation of the business. Generally it relates to the production of goods,
as, for example, a machine or formula for the production of an
article. It may, however, relate to the sale of goods or to other operations in the business, such as a code for determining discounts, rebates
or other concessions in a price list or catalogue, or a list of specialized
customers, or a method of bookkeeping or other office management.
... An exact definition of a trade secret is not possible. Some factors
to be considered in determining whether given information is one's
trade secret are: (1) the extent to which the information is known
outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the
value of the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the
amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information
could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. .... 8

This comment, of course, does not describe the legal basis for
protecting trade secrets, but other parts of the same section of
the Restatement indicate that, apart from breach of contract, it
rests upon a showing of abuse of confidence.4 This justification
rejects the theory that trade secrets are to be protected as property
rights and accepts the notion, first developed in America by Mr.
Justice Holmes, that the gravamen of the cause of action is lack
of good faith:
The word "property" as applied to . . . trade secrets is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good
faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the
3.

R SATEMENT oF ToRTs § 757, comment b at 5 (1939).
4. Id., comment a at 4.
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"defendant knows the facts, whatever they are, through a special
confidence that he accepted. The property may be denied but the
confidence cannot be. Therefore the starting point for the present
matter is not property ....
but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs . . . and the first thing to be
made sure of is that the defendant shall not fraudulently abuse the

trust reposed in him.5

Justifying the protection of trade secrets on the basis of confidentiality rather than property has had the appearance of
greatly increasing the rights of those with valuable information
by impliedly obviating any requirement that this information be
fairly novel or inventive. In this regard a trade secret differs
markedly from a patent:
The patent monopoly is a reward to the inventor. But such
is
not the case with a trade secret. Its protection is not based on a
policy of rewarding or otherwise encouraging the development of
secret processes or devices. The protection is merely against breach of
faith and reprehensible means of learning another's secret. For this
limited protection it is not appropriate to require also the kind of
novelty and invention which is a requisite of patentability.6
Since most courts at one time did require that trade secrets
possess a fair degree of novelty as a condition of protectability, 7
it is tempting to regard the Restatement's position as a major
step forward in the protection of trade secrets. This temptation
must be resisted, however, not so much because a few courts8 and
writers9 still insist that real inventiveness is a basic element of a
know-how claim, but because the broad requirement that trade
secrets be secret tends to encompass the matter of invention.
One claiming a protectable interest must prove not only that he
tried to keep his know-how secret'0 but that he had a secret to
keep."1 If the alleged know-how involves no novelty, it may be
5. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917).

6. RESTAThmENT or ToRTs § 757, comment b at 7 (1939).
7. See, e.g., Bell & Bogart Soap Co. v. Petrolia Mfg. Co., 25 Misc. 66, 54 N.Y.S. 663
(Sup. Ct. 1898).
8. See, e.g., A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531 (6th Cir.

1934).

9. See, e.g., Note, Trade Secrets After Sears and Compco, 53 VA. L. REV. 356, 364
(1967).
10. RESTATM ENT or ToRTs § 757, comment b (1939).
11. See, e.g., National Starch Prods., Inc. v. Polymer Indus., Inc., 273 App. Div. 732,
79 N.Y.S.2d 357, appeal denied, 274 App. Div. 822, 81 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1st Pe:2,'t 1948).
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denied protection not on that ground alone but because it does
not qualify as a secret.' 2 Furthermore, it may be difficult to
establish a breach of confidence where the defendant takes or disseminates information already generally known in the industry."'
On the other hand, it is sometimes thought that justifying
the protection of know-how in terms of confidentiality has hurt
the owners of trade secrets by denying them recourse to the criminal law. Thus it is said that:
.. criminal law is based on traditional property concepts and does
not provide effective relief in the case of a trade secret. The owner of
property must be deprived of possession and use of the property
before a crime can be established, and where formulas or blueprints
are copied there is no actual taking and depriving of ownership and
possession within the classical meaning of these terms under criminal
law. .... 14
This approach carries with it the implied suggestion that
criminal sanctions would be available in cases of theft of valuable information if know-how were considered a species of property, and that this development has been impeded by the
rationale of confidentiality. But the real obstacle, as we shall see,
is not the property-confidentiality dichotomy but the fact that
most theft statutes require the taking of tangible property,
whereas know-how frequently is intangible in nature.
It is plain that neither the definition of know-how nor the
justification that is used to explain its protected status can serve
as a reliable predictor of judicial results. The definition and
rationale are meaningful only in the context of the various trade
secret cases that come before the courts for resolution. For sake of
exposition, this paper will divide those cases into situations of
misappropriation and exploitation.
I. MISAPPROPRIATION

The clearest case of misappropriation of know-how is the
outright theft of valuable information in situations in which the
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., DeFilippis v. Chrysler Corp., 159 F.2d 478, 481 (2d Cir. 1947): "Certainly plaintiff cannot be said to have disclosed to defendant a device which defendant

was already manufacturing"
14.

Howes, The Protection of Industrial Property and Trade Secrets, in LAW FoR

ExEcurivEs 164, 176 (Moore ed. 1968).
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thief has no reasonable way of contending that it belonged to him.
Blatant cases of industrial espionage fit this classification, including cases in which employees of the owner of the know-how act
as "double agents" for others. Ordinarily in the case of theft it
is normal to seek recourse under the penal laws, but the theft of
know-how presents the particular problem, to which allusion has
already been made, stemming from the fact that it frequently is
intangible in nature. Most theft statutes require the taking of
"goods" or the like, and these key words are defined or interpreted
to exclude intangibles. 15 The most important federal statute applying to theft of know-how is the National Stolen Property
Act 6 and it follows this scheme. Section 2314, paragraph one of
the Act provides that:
Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce any goods,
wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value of $5000 or

more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by
fraud .

.

. shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not

more than 10 years or both.Because of this language, the Act was commonly regarded as
not covering intangibles. An effort was made in 1963 to correct
this alleged deficiency by amending section 2314 by adding that:
Whoever transports, or discloses to another who transports, in
interstate or foreign commerce any trade secret which he is not authorized to use on his own behalf or disclose to others, knowing the
same to have been unlawfully appropriated or copied, stolen, converted or taken by fraud . . .
and by adding to section 2311 the following definition:
'Trade secret' means and includes any confidential, technical
or other confidential business information, regardless of whether it is
in written or other tangible form, which is not generally available to
the public, and which gives one who uses it an advantage over com15. See generally Current Legislation: Trade Secrets, 7 B. C. IND. & COM. L Rav. 324
(1966).
16. National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-2317 (1964).
17. See, e.g., W. WADE, INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE AND MIS-USE OF TRADE SECRETS 87(1964):
"The term 'goods' obviously applies only to tangible property such as samples, documents and devices and would not apply to proprietary information such as 'know-how'
or trade secrets in the mind of employee or thief, or any other confidential information
not having the physical attribute of 'goods'. . . . Therefore, it is apparent that this act
is insufficient to protect industry against misappropriation and disclosure by employees,
ex-employees and industrial 'pirates'."
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petitors who. do not know or use it. It includes, but is not limited to,
secret formulas, processes, patterns, drawings, specifications, memorandums, maps, lists, statistics and any copies thereof regardless by
whom made.18

This effort was defeated when the bill died in committee.
In 1965 another bill 9 was introduced in the House of
Representatives, taking substantially the same form as the 1963
bill and making it clear that intangible trade secrets could be
the subject matter of theft. This bill too was defeated.
It was against this legislative background that the celebrated
case of United States v. Bottone20 came on for trial. The defendants in this criminal case had worked out an elaborate scheme
to steal drug information from Lederle Laboratories, a division
of American Cyanamid Company, and to sell it to European drug
manufacturers without incurring the penalties of the National
Stolen Property Act. The plan was to have two disloyal Lederle
employees, Fox and Cancelarich, "remove documents from Lederle's files at Pearl River, N.Y., take these to Fox's home within
New York state, make photocopies, microfilms or notes, and then
restore the purloined papers to the files; only the copies and notes
moved .or were intended to move in interstate or foreign commerce." 21 Obviously, this project was designed to avoid the pitfalls of two earlier cases, United States v. Sedgraves2 2 and United
States v. Lester,23 which had held that the National Stolen Property Act was' violated where the papers. transported in interstate or
foreign commerce belonged to the victimized industry. The fact
that the papers to be transported by Fox and Cancelarich and
others were only copies of the originals which had been returned
to the files was intended to provide the argument, in case of
trouble, that no goods belonging to Lederle had been transported
in interstate or foreign commerce. As an incidental feature, the
plan put the defendants in a position to argue that even if the
court found that Lederle's goods had been stolen and transported
in interstate or foreign commerce that these goods, in the form of
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

H.R. REP. No. 5217, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
H.R. REP. No. 5578, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966).
365 F.2d 389, 393 (2d Cir. 1966).
265 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1959).
282 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 937 (1961).
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copies of originals still in Lederle's possession, were not worth
$5000, as required by the statute.
Fox and Cancelarich and others involved in the plot were
apprehended and convicted of violating the National Stolen
Property Act. In affirming the conviction, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, through an opinion written by Chief Judge
Friendly, gave short shrift to the $5000-value argument but found
that the transportation-of-stolen-goods-in-foreign-commerce argument raised serious questions of law:
The only serious point of law raised by appellants is whether
the -transportation of papers describing the Lederle processes constituted the transportation in"interstate or foreign commerce of 'any
goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value of $5000
or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken
by fraud.' 18 U.S.C. § 2314. The problem is not any doubt on our
part that papers describing manufacturing procedures are goods,
wares, or merchandise, as was held with respect to geophysical maps
in ... . (Seagraves and Lester). Neither do we have any concern
over the value of these papers, since we dismiss out of hand the contentions that secret processes for which European drug manufacturers
were willing to pay five and six figures and in whose illicit exploitation appellants eagerly invested a large portion of their time and an

appreciable amount of their fortunes were not worth the $5000 required to subject them to federal prosecution. . . . The serious question is whether, on the facts of this case, the papers showing Lederle
processes that were transported in interstate or foreign commerce were
'goods' which had been 'stolen, converted or taken by fraud' in
view of the lack of proof that any of the physical materials so transported came from Lederle's possession ....
The case differs in
this respect from the Third Circuit cases of Seagraves and Lester
where, as the records on appeal show, the photostats and tracings
delivered by the Gulf Oil Geologist were the property of the company, having been made in the company's office, on its paper and
with its equipment.
We are not persuaded, however, that a different result should
obtain simply because the intangible information that was the purpose of the theft was transformed and embodied in a different physical object. To be sure, where no tangible objects were ever taken or
transported' a court would be hard pressed to conclude that 'goods'
Pit'd been stolen and transported within the meaning of § 2314;
the::statute would presumably not extend to the case where a care-{iully. guarded secret formula-vas memorized, carried away in the-re-
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cesses of a thievish mind and placed in writing only after a boundary
had been crossed. The situation, however, is quite different where
tangible goods are stolen and transported and the only obstacle to
condemnation is a clever intermediate transcription or use of a photocopy machine. In such a case, when the physical form of the stolen
goods is secondary in every respect to the matter recorded in them,
the transformation of the information in the stolen papers into a
tangible object never possessed by the original owner should be
24
deemed immaterial ....

Judge Friendly's dictum concerning the non-applicability of
the National Stolen Property Act to cases where know-how is
stolen "in the recesses of a thievish mind and placed in writing
only after a boundary had been crossed" underscores a serious
weakness of the statute, but this weakness should not obscure the
fact that Bottone, by eschewing technicalities, has taken a major
step forward in the protection of trade secrets. The "thievish
mind" dictum ultimately may prove to be a most important aspect
of this contribution, because it may yet provide the incentive
that Congress needs to reform the National Stolen Property Act
along the lines proposed in 1963 and 1965.
Most states also define theft in such a way that intangibles
are not covered, thus permitting with criminal impunity the
intra-state taking of know-how by way of memorization.2 5 Additionally, some state statutes define theft in terms of property that
might exclude the kind of result that was obtained in Seagraves
and Lester.26 Happily and significantly, there seems to be some
movement away from these positions. A recently enacted amendment to the New Jersey Criminal Code, 27 for example, now
24. 365 F.2d 389, 398-94 (2d Cir. 1966).
25. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.30 and § 155.00 (McKinney 1967). Section 155.80
makes a person guilty of grand larceny in the third degree when he steals secret scientific
material having a value of $250 or more. Section 155.00 defines "secret scientific material"
to mean "a sample, culture, microorganism, specimen, record, recording, document, drawing or any other article, material, device or substance which constitutes, represents, evidences, reflects or records a scientific or technical process, invention or formula or any
part or phase thereof, and which is not, and is not intended to be, available to anyone
other than the person or persons rightfully in possession thereof."
26. See supra note 15.
27. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:119-5.1 to .5 (1969). One purpose of this statute Is
"to make clear that articles representing trade secrets, including the trade secrets represented thereby, . . . can be the subject of criminal acts." § 2A:119-5.1. This purpose
is accomplished by providing that any person "who, with intent to deprive or withhold
from the owner thereof the control of a trade secret, or with an intent to appropriate
a trade secret to his own use or to the use of another, (a) steals or embezzles an article
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makes it clear that the theft of an "article" representing trade
secrets is punishable, and that a distinction between the trade
secret itself (i.e., the ultimate information) and its embodiment
in some substance (e.g., a map, blueprint, writing, model, microorganism) will not be entertained.2 This slight advance brings
New Jersey abreast of the developments achieved by the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in the Seagraves and Lester cases,
but it does not overcome the difficulty suggested by Bottone,
quite possibly because it antedated that case. In any event, one
commentator, while applauding the forward thrust of the New
Jersey legislation, was quick to find it inadequate because of its
failure to cover intangibles.29
Indiana passed criminal legislation" in 1963 that covers intangibles and should provide a model for the other states. The
Indiana statute, the most forward-looking to come to the attention of the writer, simply proscribes the theft of "property,"31
and then defines "property" to mean "anything of value" including "intangibles as well as tangibles." 32 This statute might have
been improved by explicitly stating, as New York and New Jersey
and other states8 3 have done, that trade secrets are property, but
the real obstacle, as we have seen, is not the reluctance of the
courts to find this as a fact, but their hesitancy to find that the taking of an intangible amounts to theft under statutes that routinely define the subject matter of theft in tangible terms.
Indiana has overcome this obstacle, and it would be nothing short
of remarkable if its legislation got hung up on some metaphysical
notion that trade secrets are not a species of property. 4
representing a trade secret, or, (b) without authority makes or causes to be made a
copy of an article representing a trade secret . . ." is guilty of a misdemeanor if the
value of the article is less than $200 and of a high misdemeanor if such value is $200
or more. § 2A:119-5.3. The word "article" is defined so as to exclude intangibles. It
means "any object, material, device or substance or copy thereof, including any writing,
record, recording, drawing, sample, specimen, prototype, model, photograph, microorganism, blueprint or map." § 2A:l19-5.2(a).
28. Id. § 2A:119-5.1.
29. See supra note 15, at 329.
30. Offenses Against Property Act, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-3028 to 10-3041 (Supp.
1970).
31. Id. § 10-3080.
52. Id. § 10-3040(15): "'Property' means anything of value. Property includes real
as well as personal property: intangibles as well as tangibles;.
33. See, e.g., IL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 15-1 (1965).
34. For possible metaphysical arguments and difficulties, see Nash, The Concept of
"Property" in Know-How as a Growing Area of Industrial Property:Its Sale and Licensing,
6 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. Or RESEARCH AND ED. 289 (1962).
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Commercial bribery statutes also are available in a few states
to give some criminal law protection to know-how. Among
these, the New York 35 and New Jersey statutes" are the most
promiment. The New Jersey statute provides that:
Any person who gives, offers or promises any gift or gratuity to
any employee without the knowledge and consent of his employer,
and with intent to influence his action in relation to his employer's
business, and any employee, who, without the knowledge and consent
of -his employer, requests or accepts any gift or gratuity, or any promise to make a gift or to do any act beneficial to himself, under an
agreement or understanding that he shall act in any particular manner to his employer's business, is a disorderly person.
Another New Jersey statute provides that a disorderly person
may be imprisoned up to one year or fined $1000, or both 7
A New York statute is similar in scope but uses the phrase
"commercial bribing""' rather than "disorderly person" to describe the nature of the proscribed activity. It should be noted,
of course, that these statutes appear sufficiently broad to cover
know-how even when it is intangible, because the outlawed activity is not the taking or transportation of something, but the
reprehensible conduct of one who takes or gives a bribe to influence an employee with relation to his employer's business and
without the latter's knowledge and consent. For this reason, it
has been suggested that the New York and New Jersey statutes
may be applicable in cases where an employee is induced by a
salary increase to enter into employment with a competitor of his
original employer, if, as a condition of such employment, he is
expected to disclose some of the trade secrets of his original
employer.39 But no such cases have yet come before the courts.
Indeed, although the New York and New Jersey statutes have
been on the books for many years, only one case in each state has
been found in which these statutes have been applied to the mis35.

N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 180.00 and 180.05 (McKinney 1967) (based on N.Y. PENAL

LAw § 439 (1909)).
36. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-80 (1953).
57. Id. § 2A:169-4.
38. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 180.00.(McKinney 1967).
39. -Klein, The Technical-Trade Secret Quadrangle:A Survey, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 437,
464 (1960).
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appropriation of trade secrets.40 This paucity of use creates the
suspicion that public prosecutors and aggrieved owners of knowhow do not regard these statutes as appropriate vehicles for the.
protection of trade secrets. Surely the actual text of these statutes
indicates "that they were primarily designed to prevent influence
being brought to bear on an employee's performance of the positive duties of his job rather than to guard against breach of his
negative duty not to betray his employer's secrets." 41 This fact
and the fact that the overwhelming number of prosecutions
brought under these statutes involve bribers seeking to affect the
"positive duties" of the job42 and not the "negative duty" of confidentiality may mean that these laws are not available to protect
know-how except in extreme cases. On the other hand, these facts
may mean only that public prosecutors and the owners of .trade
secrets -need more education regarding the great dangers of industrial espionage and the weapons that are available to curtail it.
In this respect, perhaps one recent development in the protection
of know-how is that scholars are now calling attention to the New
York and New Jersey commercial bribery .statutes as a potential
weapon against industrial spies and pirates.
Even where criminal prosecutions are possible, civil actions
provide the chief remedies for the misappropriation of trade
secrets. This is the case because most owners are more concerned
with keeping the competitive advantage inherent in a trade secret,
than with putting someone in jail..A criminal action may follow
civil suits involving outrageous misappropriation, but even in
these extreme cases recourse to. the civil law usually is taken first.
The injunction is the favorite remedy of the aggrieved
owner of know-how because it is fast and flexible. A speedy
remedy is necessary in many cases to prevent the loss of the trade
40. See Applebee v. Skiwanek, 27 N.Y. Crim. 78, 140 N.Y.S. 450 (Magis. Ct. 1912);
State v. Landecker, 100 N.J.L. 195, 126 A. 408 (Sup. Ct. 1924), aff'd, 103 N.J.L.
716, 137 A. 919 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927). In Applebee the New York court held that a
person who pays another for the purpose of receiving a secret machine used exclusively by
the latter's employer influences the employee's action in regard to his employer's business
and hence is guilty of violating the statute. In Landecker the New Jersey court held its
statute was violated where one paid money to the employee of a competitor for the purpose
of acquiring a secret formula owned by the competitor.
41. See supra note 15, at 327.
42. One of the most common situations in which the New York commercial bribery
statute has been employed involves the giving of a bribe to a purchasing agent to induce
him to buy goods for his principal from the briber. E.g., Berry Packing Corp. v. Packer's
Super Markets, Inc., 45 Misc. 2d 40, 255 N.Y.SRd 691 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
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secret through dissemination or exploitation. A flexible remedy
is needed to fashion relief in such a manner that the comparative
marketing positions of the parties are restored. The injunction
is ideally suited to these requirements. It is a speedy remedy
because a temporary restraining order, preliminary to the issuance of a final injunction, can be obtained in most states on an
ex parte basis upon the presentation of affidavits alleging the misappropriation of a trade secret and by showing that this violation
will result in an irreparable loss. Abuse of this extraordinary
power is deterred by the requirement in most states that the plaintiff furnish a bond to cover the defendant's damages should it be
shown at a later time that the temporary restraining order was
unjustified. The injunction is also very flexible, and American
courts have shown a willingness to set the scope and duration of
its relief to put the aggrieved party in trade secret cases in as
good a position as he would have enjoyed had the misappropriation not occurred. In some cases this means that perpetual relief
will be given 43 and in others that mandatory orders for the
destruction of tools and models will issue.44 In outrageous cases
a mandatory injunction carrying perpetual relief may be awarded,
often accompanied with exemplary damages. General Aniline
Corp. v. Frantz45 is such a case. There the defendant hired an exemployee of General Aniline to acquire knowledge and drawings
which he had stolen from that company. This information, plus
that obtained from a spy in the General Aniline plant, enabled the
defendant to produce within three months a product comparable
to the one General Aniline was making. It was found that one in
the normal course of fair dealing would have had to spend vast
sums of money and two or three years of time to make a product
comparable to General Aniline's and that the defendant's piracy
had saved him this money and time. The court issued a mandatory
injunction requiring the defendant to deliver up for destruction
items such as tools, jigs, models, machines, dies, etc., used in conjunction with any product employing or utilizing General Aniline's trade secrets. It also permanently enjoined the defendant
from manufacturing, selling or distributing any product using
43. See, e.g., Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1953).
44. See, e.g., General Aniline Corp. v. Frantz, 50 Misc. 2d 994, 274 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sup.
Ct. 1966).
45. Id.
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these trade secrets, and additionally awarded exemplary damages
in the amount of $50,000.
An accounting for profits derived by the party from his misappropriation of trade secrets also is a popular and potent remedy
and it can be decreed in addition to injunctive relief." Of course,
there must be profits before this remedy is helpful. In General
Aniline, the defendant had not started to sell the product and
hence had made no profit from the misappropriation of the knowhow. Because of this fact, the court held that General Aniline
was not entitled to an award for profits.
Compensatory damages also may be claimed by the aggrieved
owner or misappropriated know-how, and such damages may not
be denied on the ground that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy
in equity for an injunction or an accounting of profits. This point
was clearly made by Judge Cohn in an important New York case:
Where, as here, one's property rights are infringed, he is not
bound to seek a remedy in a court of equity to terminate the wrong,
but, if he so elects, may bring an action at law to recover money damIn circumstances similar to those set forth in
ages for the injury ....
the present complaint, injunction is usually resorted to because an
However,
action at law does not furnish an adequate remedy ....
it is well settled that a party who sues at law and states a legal
cause of action cannot be turned out of the court of law because he
has an adequate remedy in equity, even though the latter be the better remedy. In the action at law relief is administered in the form of
pecuniary compensation in damages for the injury sustained; in the
other the court has discretionary power to adapt the relief to the
circumstances of the case.47
As Judge Cohn indicates, usually the aggrieved plaintiff
seeks equitable relief in the form of an injunction and an accounting for profits because of the flexibility, speed and general adequacy of these remedies. Compensatory damages in trade secret
cases frequently are difficult to prove and this is another reason
for preferring equitable relief. In appropriate cases both equitable and legal relief are available. The interesting case 48 involving
the misappropriation of the secret process utilized in producing
Rise Shaving Cream illustrates this point. In this case a royalty of
46.
47.
1946).
48.

See, e.g., Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter Products, 230 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1956).
Spiselman v. Rabinowitz, 270 App. Div. 548, 551, 61 N.Y.S.2d 138, 141 (1st Dep't
Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter Products, 230 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1956).

BU.FFALO LAW )?EVIEW •

1.0%, ,of the net sales, of the misappropriating competitor. was allowed as an accounting for profits; compensatory damages were
given to cover the loss suffered by the trade-secret owner with
respect to its own sales. An injunction was issued and attorneys'
fees in excess of $500,000 were awarded. The case also illustrates
the accuracy of the broad statement concerning remedies for misappropriated trade secrets found in comment (e) to section 757
of the Restatement of Torts:
One who has a right under the rule stated in this Section is en-

titled to a remedy or remedies appropriate under the circumstances.

He may recover damages for past harm, or be granted an injunction
against future harm by disclosure or adverse use, or be granted an
accounting of the wrongdoer's profits, or have the physical things
embodying the secret, such as designs, patterns and so forth, surrendered by the wrongdoer for destruction. Moreover he may have two
or more of these remedies in the same action if the court is competent
to administer them ...

If at one time the effort was to give the plaintiff an adequate
remedy against those who had misappropriated his trade secrets,
later developments took the back-lash form of claiming that the
remedies were too protective. The remedy of the injunction particularly caused concern. In this respect, the leading case of
Shellmar Prods. Co. v. Allen-Qualley' Co.4 9 was singled out for
criticism. Prior to this case it had been assumed that after information, at one time a trade secret, became public knowledge it no
longer was entitled to protection. But Shellmar, stressing the inequitable conduct of the defendant in discovering a trade secret
of the plaintiff, held that the defendant could be permanently
enjoined from using the know-how even after it became public
knowledge. Possibly as a result of the reaction to Shellmar, the
5 rules developed in some
so-called Conmar
states as important
limitations on injunctive relief. These rules are based on the
premise that trade secrets may be protected only so long as they
remain secret. Thus an injunction protecting a trade secret must
be dissolved when the valuable information becomes public
knowledge by virtue of some activity not associated with the
49. 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 695 (1937).
50. These rules are derived from the decision of Conmar Prods.
Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949).
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enjoined misappropriation. 5' But under these rules even the misappropriator is not forever barred from using misappropriated
information, because the purpose of the injunction and the other
remedies protecting know-how is designed only to put the aggrieved owner of trade secrets in the same position he would have
occupied had there been no misappropriation. Reasoning from
this premise, a recent case has held that the duration of injunctive
relief is only for that estimated period of time that it would
have taken a competitor to reverse engineer and market the product on his own. 52 A variation of this Conmar rule is that the
estimated reverse engineering time should start to run as of the
time of the injunction, thus protecting the aggrieved owner of
misappropriated know-how even though his secret had been discovered through the reverse engineering efforts of another com8
petitor.Y
It is probably safe to say that the Conmar rules have not yet
run their course and that they represent an exciting development
in the American law protecting know-how. Even with the limitations on protection that they impose, however, it also is safe to say
that there is major agitation in the United States today to overhaul the entire law of trade secrets so as to bring it into line
with federal public policy, particularly that represented by federal pafent law, and with the general interests of society in a
market place that is relatively free of restraints.5 4 This movement
almost necessarily portends some limitations on the protection of
know-how as it has developed under the common law of America.
The argument that the state law of trade secrets frustrates
federal patent policy has been made succinctly as follows:
The Constitution gives Congress power to promote the useftil
arts and sciences by granting -limited protection. Congress has emphasized the interest of the public by enacting the patent law. Rewarding the inventor is only a secondary consideration. The grantee's ideas
must advance useful knowledge and there must be disclosure so that
the protected ideas may be freely used by the public at the expiration of seventeen years. Thus, patent law is protected disclosure
51. See, e.g., Space Aero Prols. Co. v. R. E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74
(1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1966).
52. Winston Research Corp- v.- Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir.
1965).-,
:
53. Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 33 111. 2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965).
64: For a review of the literature see Note, The Trade Secret Quagmire-A Proposed
Federal Solution, 50 MINN. L. R v. 1049 (1966).
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which confers immediate benefits on the innovator and the ultimate
benefits on society.
Trade secret law, however, is protected secrecy. The only true
beneficiary is the trade secret owner, who is in fact overprotected.
The incongruity of approach is highlighted in actions for patent infringement which include an alternative claim for trade secret violation. If the patent is invalidated, the owner may still get equivalent
relief under trade secret law. All information contained in an invalidated patent enters the public domain, and is usable by anyone
except the adjudged trade secret appropriator.
Another conflict with patent policy exists when an idea embodied
in an expired patent is protected as a trade secret. . . . Furthermore,
a system of protected secrecy allows the owners of patentable innovations to avoid the impact of public disclosure. Thus there is incentive
to rely on secrecy and escape the disclosure condition of patent
protection, particularly where the product is incapable of reverse
engineering. This diminishes the effectiveness of the patent laws because the innovator can avoid the choice between disclosure and loss
of protection. If the secrecy can be maintained, protection could exist
for longer than seventeen years. The public may be deprived of the
benefit indefinitely. Because of the unpredictability of trade secret
law, the owner, by use of either threats of litigation or enforcement of
a broad, vague injunction, is afforded greater protection for his
idea than is the patentee who must meet a high standard of innovation
and who must litigate within the scope of his patent claims. The recent
case of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. suggests that the United
States Supreme Court is becoming more sensitive to encroachments
5
on the federal patent policy....
7
do reveal that the
Sears5" and its companion case CornpcoN
Supreme Court is becoming more sensitive "to encroachments on
the federal patent policy" by state laws, but not necessarily the
state law of trade secrets. Indeed, a fair reading of these cases tends
to show only that the federal government now has preempted
much of the predatory-business-practice law (usually called the
law of "unfair competition") but not the law of trade secrets."'

55. Id. at 1059-61.

56. Sears, Roebuck &Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
57. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
58. For a review of the cases substantiating this point of view, see Note, Trade Secrets
After Sears and Compco, 53 VA. L. REv. 356 (1967). Cases particularly showing that Sears
and Compco have not preempted the state law of trade secrets include Winston Research
Corp. v. Minnesota Mining &.Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965); Schulenburg v.
Signatrol, Inc., 33 Il. 2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965); Servo Corp. of America v. Gen. Elc,
Co., 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1964).
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But Sears and Cornpco have served to stimulate a reexamination
of the efficacy of state trade secret laws and a consideration of the
possible desirability of federal legislation, carrying a flexible set
of rules designed along the lines of the most forward-looking state
laws and mandating uniform application throughout the country.
Thus, these cases undoubtedly were instrumental 59 in bringing
forth a proposed amendment to the Lanham Act which would
create a federal tort in cases of wrongful disclosure or misappropriation of trade secrets 0 While this amendment has not yet been
enacted, it does represent a recent development in the protection
of know-how that may portend things to come.
To this point our discussion of misappropriation of know-how
has involved outrageous cases of industrial espionage and piracy,
and there is every reason to believe that the existence and quality
of the remedies we have been surveying are conditioned by this
pernicious background. The cases make it quite clear that the
courts will provide a remedy of bite and durability where the
defendant has acted in bad faith. Conversely, where there is little
proof of bad faith, the courts are reluctant to provide extensive
relief.0 1 Stated differently, the conduct of the defendant seems to
be the most important single factor in a know-how case. Therefore,
when one moves away from the area of industrial espionage and
into situations in which trade secrets are divulged under less outrageous circumstances, it is not strange to find that the remedies
are sharply curtailed.
At least three common situations exist in which know-how
may be divulged under more or less innocent circumstances. The
first involves public documents. Trade secrets may be endangered by the necessity of furnishing information to the courts
59. "The need for a federal unfair competition act has been further illustrated by
two decisions of the United States Supreme Court in 1964, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
" Brief in Support of Con.
Company and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc ..
gressional Passage of Proposed Unfair Competition Amendment to Lanham Trademark
Act of 1946, 57 TRADEMARK REP. 88, 93 (1967).
60. S. REP. No. 1154, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Section 43 (a) (4) of this bill provides:
Any person who shall engage in any act, trade practice, or course of conduct, in
commerce, which . . . (4) results or is likely to result in the wrongful disclosure or
misappropriation of a trade secret or other research or development or commercial
information maintained in confidence by another shall be liable in a civil action for
unfair competition.
61. See, e.g., Schreyer v. Casco Products Corp., 97 F. Supp. 159 (D. Conn. 1951), aff'd,
190 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1951) (because only slight breach of faith was proved, no injunction
was granted and the plaintiff was relegated to an action for damages).
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where it is relevant to litigation or to government agencies, such
as the Federal Trade Commission or the Security and Exchange
Commission. An owner of know-how may be unwilling to disclose it in court, and this may result in a non-suit where he is the
plaintiff, because it is not sufficient to allege that the defendant
misappropriated his trade secret without revealing what that
secret is.02 On the other hand, where the owner of the know-how
is the defendant in a lawsuit he may be compelled to disclose his
secret.6 The owner of trade secrets, be he plaintiff or defendant,
can protect those secrets in litigation by asking the court to hear
them in camera and by having it made clear that the other party
to the lawsuit receives them on a confidential basis. Similar kinds
of protection are available to the owners of trade secrets who are
required to reveal them to administrative agencies.0 4 If protective steps are not taken, the secret may be innocently lost under
circumstances in which the original owner has no cause of action
against anyone. 5 This is due to the fact that civil law remedies
are limited by a principle, implicit in the criminal law, that innocent parties are not liable for using or disclosing trade secrets. In
this respect, of course, trade secrets differ from patent law. Section
758 of the Restatement of Torts declares the trade secret rule:
One who learns another's trade secret from a third person without notice that it is secret and that the third person's disclosure is a

breach of his duty to the other, or who learns the secret through a
mistake without notice of the secrecy and the mistake, (a) is not liable
to the other for a disclosure or use of the secret prior to receipt of
such notice, and (b) is liable to the other for a disclosure or use of
the secret after the receipt of such notice, unless prior thereto he has
in good faith paid value for the secret or has so changed his position

that to subject him to liability would be inequitable.
A second situation far less pernicious than industrial espionage in which trade secrets are frequently lost is that in which
they are disclosed during unsuccessful negotiations for their sale
62. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Wirthman Drug Co., 48 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1931).
63. See, e.g., Grasselli Chemical Co. v. National Aniline & Chemical Co., 282 F.
381 (S.D.N.Y. 1920). In this case Judge Learned Hand stated:

379,

No doubt the situation is difficult, on the one hand, to secure the plaintiff's right
to get relevant evidence, and, on the other hand, to protect the defendant from
disclosing secrets which are not material. In the end, the right of the plaintiff to bring
out the truth must prevail....
64. W. WADE, supra note 17, at 71.
65. Cf. E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917).
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or the sale of a,product of substance in which they :are -embodied.
There is no doubt that the courts will impose liability on one
who subsequently appropriates a trade secret disclosed to him in
confidence during the course of unsuccessful negotiations with its
6 Some of these cases verge on industrial
owner.0
espionage or
piracy and relief is quickly granted. 7 But often it is difficult to
prove that the defendant made use of the trade secret in subsequently manufacturing the product in question. In that event, of
course, no liability will be imposed.68
By far the most common case of divulging trade secrets under
innocent circumstances is where the owner reveals them to his
own employees. Since, as we have seen, the basis for protecting
trade secrets is confidentiality, an employee is not liable for divulging a tiade secret unless he knows it to be such.609 "There can
be no betrayal of confidence unless there is a confidence .to betray
and it is known to be a confidence.1 70 The mobile employee presents a further complication, because the law is clear that he is
entitled to' take with him to his new employment his native skills
as enhanced by his employment experiences. He is not required
to "wipe clean the slate of his memory." 71 This rule is a fair one,
but it usually results in the original employer's trade secrets being
innocently used or divulged, because once the employee knows
them it may be virtually impossible for him to pu't them out of
mind. The original employer's best protection lies' in an express
covenant by the employee not .to compete with the employer or to
reveal his trade secrets. Such a covenant will be enforced if the
employer is acting in good ,faith and it does 'not unreasonably restrict the employee.7
66. See, e.g., Shellmar Prods. Co. v. Allen-Quality Co., 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 301 U.S. 695 (1936).
67. See, e.g., Booth v. Stutz Motor Car Co. of America, 56 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 19,2).
68. See, e.g., Gilbert v. General Motors Corp., 41 F. Supp. 525 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 183
F.2d 997 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 743 (1943).
69. See, e.g., National Starch Prods., Inc. v. Polymer Indus., Inc., 273 App. Div. 732, 79
N.Y.S.2d 857 (1st Dep't 1948), appeal denied, 274 App. Div. 822, 81 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1st
Dep't 1948).
70. See Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. Rav. 625, 668
(1960).
71. "All that clearly appears is that he undertook to use in his new employment the
knowledge he had acquired in the old. This, if it involves no breach of confidence, is not
unlawful; for equity has no power to compel a man who changes employers to wipe clean
the slate of his memory." Peerless Pattern Co. v. Pictorial Review Co., 147 App. Div. 715,
717, 132 N.Y.S. 37, 39 (Ist Dep't 1911).
72. For an encyclopaedic collection of cases on this point up to 1960, see Blake,
supra note 70.
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These three situations in which trade secrets may be
divulged under more or less innocent circumstances have another
aspect which permits exploitation. This is particularly true with
regard to the mobile employee.
II.

EXPLOITATION

Aside from the argument that the protection of know-how
always benefits its owner at the expense of the general public, 78
it is plain that the law of trade secrets has been used in various
ways by some unscrupulous people for purposes of unfair exploitation. One such use is its utilization by selfish employers to
reduce the mobility of their employees. This kind of exploitation
is possible because the employee's covenant not to compete with
his employer or to reveal his trade secrets, discussed supra, may
have an in terrorem effect that deters the employee from seeking
new employment. 74 Some recent cases show that the courts are
aware of this possibility and determined to suppress it. Suppressive measures take the form of judicial scrutinization of the covenant for fairness 75 and, perhaps more importantly, of refusal to
give effect to severability clauses in unreasonably restrictive
agreements. 76 If the postemployment agreement is unreasonable,
it will be struck down, but for many years some courts have partially saved these agreements if they contain a severability clause
by "blue penciling" the offensive language and permitting the
remainder to stand. 77 While it is believed that the majority of
American courts now take a position that limits the use of severability clauses in trade secret cases, some courts have recently
adopted or re-affirmed the blue-pencil test, 78 and it is not clear
in which direction the courts are moving on this matter. This
ambivalence may result from the fact that it is not certain that
most, or even many, postemployment covenants are unfairly
exploitive. Broadly worded covenants may have an in terrorem
effect, but statistics prove that American workers still are remarkably mobile. Statistics also show that millions of dollars worth of
78.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
(1967).

See supra note 54, at 1060.
See Blake, supra note 70, at 682.
Id. at 689.
See, e.g., Sonotone Corp. v. Baldwin, 227 N.C. 387,42 S.E.2d 352 (1947).
See Blake, supra note 70, at 682, particularly n. 193.
See, e.g., E.P.I. of Cleveland, Inc. v. Basier, 12 Ohio App. 2d 16, 230 N.E.2d 552
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trade secrets are lost every year because of this mobility. Moreover, it is not correct to assume that postemployment agreements
are necessarily, or even usually, adhesive type contracts thrust
upon helpless employees on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Current
manpower shortages, particularly in scientific fields, give the
employee sufficient bargaining power to resist offensive bargains . Notwithstanding these considerations, there is every reason to think that courts are now alert to the exploitive potential
of postemployment covenants with the consequence that many
employers now feel that it is incumbent upon them to demonstrate
by word and deed that they are acting in good faith with respect
to these agreements. In this connection a substantial literature has
been developed concerning the problems of drafting postemployment agreements and some novel agreements have been advocated
to demonstrate good faith.80
Another kind of exploitation that is made possible by the
law of trade secrets involves the confidential disclosure of information that may not be protected because of lack of novelty or
secrecy. Good ideas are not necessarily trade secrets, but when
they are revealed in confidence they may rise to that level de facto
because of the reluctance of the recipient of the information to
take the risk that it is legally unprotected. Good ideas therefore
have been unfairly exploited as trade secrets simply because the
law does not draw a sufficiently sharp distinction between the two.
There is much merit in the criticism that the fundamental weakness of trade secret law is its inherent uncertainty,8 ' and the most
dramatic cases in which this weakness has been exploited unfairly
are the ones under discussion. The courts do not seem bent in
recent years on firming up this area by requiring information to
possess a high degree of novelty to qualify as a trade secret, but
the cases indicate that they have now identified the "good-idea"
problem and are taking at least a small step to solve it. This step
involves the close examination of the alleged trade secret with
regard to exclusivity in cases where the alleged misappropriation
is more or less innocent. Following this approach, recovery has
been denied where the good idea submitted to the defendant al79. See Blake, supra note 70, at 683.
80. See, e.g., Arnold, Employee Agreement, 22 Bus. LAw. 411 (1967), setting forth a

postemployment agreement under which the departing employee is retained as a consultant
of the original employer as a consideration for his promise not to compete.
81. See Note, supra note 54, at 1054.
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ready was known by a substantial portion of the industry. 2 Since
normally trade secret law is to the effect that information will be
protected if it is secret as far as the appropriator is concerned,
the recent tendency to examine for exclusivity in cases of innocent
appropriation 'probably means that the courts are developing a
new technique t6 prevent unfair exploitation of good ideas.
The owner of know-how may fairly exploit it by licensing
others to use it. But the "quid pro quo for furnishing of knowhow cannot be an absolute license to avoid the provisions of the
Sherman Act. The harm caused thereby would be too great a
tribute to knowledge and skill when viewed in the light of public
policy.18 4 This language reveals and illustrates yet another situation in which trade secret owners have attempted to unfairly
exploit their knowledge and skill. Indeed, the effort to circumvent
the anti-trust laws through clever know-how licensing agreements
undoubtedly represents the 'most serious abuse of the law of
trade secrets and it is the one which the courts have exerted their
greatest pains to control or suppress.
. At an early date the Pullman case held that an agreement by
the seller of know-how not to use it after the sale did not violate
the antitrust laws, because "the process must be kept secret in
order to' be of any'value and the public has no interest in the
question by whoii 'it is used."85 This case is one of the most
important in the battery that makes up the law of trade secrets,
because a different result would have eliminated the whole field
of know-how licensing in America, a field that may well involve
more than a billion dollars a year.88 With Pullman on the books,
it remained for the courts to define the extent to which the owner
of a trade secret could exploit it without violating the antitrust
laws. This task has not yet been completed, but the permissible
82. See, e.g., Santilli v. Philip Morris Co., 283 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1960).
83. See, e.g., Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953).
84. United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 313 (N.D. Ohio
1949), aff'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
85. Central TraAsp. Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U.S. 24, 53 (1891).
86. See Macdonald, Know-How Licensing and the Antitrust Laws, 62 Micu. L. REv.

351 (1964): "Although exact figures are not available, the total gross royalty income
received by United States firms from foreign licensing arrangement was estimated at
500,000,000 dollars in 1957, of which know-how licensing undoubtedly constituted a substantial portion." Id. at 352. There is no doubt that know-how licensing has increased
since 1957 and that domestic licenses exceed foreign ones significantly. For these reasons,
an estimate of one billion dollars in American know-how licensing for the year 1969 may
be conservative.
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limits of know-how licensing have been brought into sharper focus
in recent years and the direction in which this law is moving is
now clearly discernible.
After Pullman the next step was to determine whether the
licensor of know-how could limit the licensee as to its use. The
Hartman8 7 case in 1907 held that the licensor could impose
within the scope of the know-how grant whatever conditions he
wished:
So long as the owner of such a secret can preserve its secrecy he has
necessarily a monopoly in its use, and there is no illegal restraint
because he refuses 'to make it public. Neither is the public interest
affected whether the process of formula is used by A. or B. or by both,
for there can be no restraint of trade in respect of a method of formula
which is known only to the discoverer and those to whom he chooses
to communicate it under restrictions. Having no right to compel a

publication, the public lose no right by respecting a restricted disclosure, for no freedom of traffic has been stifled.88

Pursuant to the principle developed in Hartman, it has been
held that the owner of know-how may impose limits on the time
during which the licensee may use the trade secret 9 and may
require that he not disclose it to others. 0 Furthermore, "analogizing from patent licensing, there is little doubt that the knowhow licensor may restrict his licensee with respect to number,
size, or description of the item to be produced."' 1
This kind of limitation is said to be within the "scope of
the grant" because it relates directly to the use of the licensed
know-how. Limitations "ancillary" to the know-how grant are
those that do not relate directly to its use but rather condition
the granting of the license on the performance or promise to perform acts that relate only indirectly to it. Ancillary restraints
include agreements by the licensee to fix the price of the goods
produced by the know-how or to place other restraints on it such
as territorial qualifications as to where it can be sold, and tying
agreements in which the licensee is required to purchase other
things from the licensor as a condition to obtaining the know-how
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907).
Id. at 30.
See cases collected by Macdonald, supranote 86, at 359.
Id.
Id.
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license. The early A ddyston Pipe case 02 broadly validated ancillary limitations on know-how grants on the theory that the
licensor could have effectuated these limitations if he had retained
the know-how and, more particularly, that he should be able to
restrain the licensee from doing him an injury which, but for
the grant, the licensee would be unable to inflict. Subsequently,
much of the important American antitrust law has revolved
around the effort to cut down Addyston Pipe. This paper obviously cannot review that entire effort, but suffice it to say that a
nuliber of United States Supreme Court and Federal Court
casesP3 have substantially eliminated Addyston Pipe, and the presumption is now strong that limitations beyond the "scope of the
grant" will violate one or more of the American antitrust laws.

4

The invalidation of indirect restraints in know-how licenses
still left problems of enforcement that gave the licensor a fighting chance of making his ancillary agreement effective de facto,
particularly where the licensee had readily agreed to the restraints,
because obviously the Attorney General does not have the capacity to supervise every know-how licensing arrangement. If, therefore, the licensee cannot set up antitrust violations as a defense to
actions brought against him by the licensor, there is a good chance
that the latter can avoid much of the impact of the antitrust laws.
Kelly v. Kosuga95 carried words from the United States Supreme
Court that encouraged licensors in this regard. This case involved
a simple suit for the price of onions which had been sold and
delivered to the defendant. The defendant, however, contended
that the sales agreement violated the Sherman Act and hence was
unenforceable. The plaintiff's motion to strike the defense was
granted by the District Court and affirmed by the Court of
92. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), af'd, 175
U.S. 211 (1899).
93. These cases include Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S.
594 (1953) (outlawing tying agreements if a substantial amount of commerce in the tying
product (know-how) is restrained); Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958)
<extending Times-Picayune); United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947)
(invalidating territorial restriction ancillary to know-how agreement); Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (prohibiting the licensor of knowhow setting price of the goods produced by the trade secret) ; United States v. General
Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949) (territorial restraint); United States v. Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), aff'd, 341 U.S. 543 (1951) (territorial restraint).
94. For an excellent review of the cases supporting this view see Macdonald, supra

note 86.
95. 358 U.S. 516 (1959).
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. On certiorari the United States
Supreme Court affirmed. Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice
Brennan said:
As a defense to an action based on contract, the plea of illegality
based on violation of the Sherman Act has not met with much favor
in this Court ....

If the defense of illegality is to be allowed as a

collateral method of enforcement of the antitrust laws, as the breadth
of the petitioner's argument suggests, it must be said that his theory
creates a very strange class of private attorneys general. 96
Additionally, two other doctrines led some know-how licensors to believe that ancillary restraints could be made effective de
facto. One doctrine was the ancient rule that the licensee under a
patent was estopped to deny the validity of his licensor's patent.
By analogy, it was believed that the licensee of know-how could
not challenge the validity of the license, because the estoppel doctrine was based on the principle that one should not be permitted
to enjoy the benefit of an agreement while simultaneously urging
that it was void. The second doctrine was the criminal law principle of in pari delicto. Under this principle it was thought that
a licensee who had been involved in the crime of violating the
antitrust laws by entering into an illegal licensing of know-how
agreement surely would be in no position to enforce those laws,
either affirmatively or defensively, against the licensor.
The hope of being able to use in pari delicto in this manner
was shattered in 1968 when the United States Supreme Court
ruled in Perma Life Mufflers 7 that it would not recognize this
doctrine as a defense to a private antitrust action. This case did
not overrule Kelly, however, because it did not go to the question
of whether or not the know-how licensee could set up antitrust
violations as a defense to claims made by the licensor stemming
from the allegedly illegal licensing agreement. It does seem, however, to have overruled Mr. Justice Brennan's dictum in that case
concerning the creation of "a very strange class of private attorneys general" and thus presents a great threat to licensors that
their illegal schemes may result in treble damages in favor of
a "private attorney general."
96. Id. at 518-20.
97.

Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
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Lear Inc. v. Adkins, 8 handed down in 1969 by the United
States Supreme Court, held that a licensee was not estopped
from attacking the validity of a patent. By analogy, the case possibly may be read as saying that the know-how licensee is free to
challenge the existence and validity of the licensor's trade secrets
and particularly the ancillary restraints he has placed about them.
There is no suggestion in the case, however, that it was intended
to overrule Kelly. In view of the direction which Lear and
PermaLife Mufflers are pointed, however, few sophisticated knowhow licensors now place much reliance on doctrines, including
Kelly, that will save them from the impact of antitrust laws de
facto simply because the Attorney General does not have the
capacity to supervise the great bulk of licensing agreements.
These decisions clearly portend a more vigorous enforcement of
the antitrust laws in know-how licensing cases at the behest of
private attorneys general, namely the know-how licensees.
III.

CONCLUSION

article"9

In a perceptive
Ladas states that there are four competing interests and demands which must be satisfied and balanced by a fair law of know-how. These are:
(I) The interests, demands and claims of an enterprise which by
costly research and experiment has developed information, inventions,
skills and knowledge, i.e., know-how, that gives to such enterprise an
advantageous competitive position in the market place. This is a
valuable business asset for the acquisition of which other enterprises
are willing to pay a price and the unauthorized disclosure or misuse
by others would inflict a serious damage to the originating enterprise.
(2) The interests, demands and claims of competing enterprises which
desire to obtain the benefit of know-how developed by others as an
effective instrument for the promotion of their interests. They are
looking out for the publication of any information on such know-how
and desire to enter into agreements to obtain communication of
know-how maintained in secrecy.
(3) The interests and claims of the community in the widest possible
intercommunication of know-how by enterprises and the resulting high
quality standards and low cost of goods, and in the avoidance of undue
or excessive restraints between those competing in the market place.
98. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
99. Ladas, supra note 2, at 166.
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(4) The interest of the social and legal order of the country concerned which would be fatally injured if the spirit of invention and
creation and the investment in research and development of knowhow was to be discouraged, and if it would be permitted to enterprises
to engage in unlawful competition and unauthorized use of secret
know-how of others, or in the disinclination to share technical knowledge and skills.
It is believed that the American law protecting know-how
effectively balances these competing interests by drawing a sharp
distinction, both in terms of judicial attitude and legislative posture, between situations of misappropriation on the one hand and
exploitation on the other. The cases show that the courts will not
tolerate lightly the outrageous misappropriation" of know-how and
strong criminal legislation is being developed to help them in
this regard. At the same time it is not considered reprehensible
for an enterprise to "re-discover" a trade secret fomerly known
only to a competitor, and it may use fairly such techniques as
reverse engineering in this quest. These two sets of principles
recognize that know-how is a valuable business asset that deserves
protection in the interest of fairness to its owner and of encouragement to the spirit of invention, while at the same time satisfying the valid claims of the community and of competing business
in maximum intercommunication of technical knowledge and
skills. The protection of this public interest also is provided by
a series of rules, doctrines and principles that are evolving to
seriously limit the possibilities-in the past rampant-of using
know-how for purposes of unfair exploitation.

